Fazlous Satter
The Chinese proverb, "Those who govern the water govern the country," aptly illustrates the significance of rivers in global history and politics. Indeed, pivotal civilizations such as the Pharaonic, Sumerian, Babylonian, and Chinese arose along the Nile, Tigris, Euphrates, and Huang He rivers, respectively.
The use of water as a strategic tool: Bangladesh, a relatively small nation crisscrossed by hundreds of rivers, is home to approximately 171 million people. A significant portion of this population resides in the floodplains and depends on an agrarian economy. The Teesta River has historically exerted considerable agricultural and economic influence on the adjacent regions, profoundly shaping the life patterns, culture, and history of its inhabitants.
However, while India encompasses only 16 percent of the Himalayan region, its river system relies heavily on the Himalayan Water Tower. As an upper riparian country, India controls and diverts the water of numerous shared rivers. India uses water as a strategic tool of ecological warfare to destabilize the lower riparian state, violating international river laws, practices, and norms.
The demand for awarding the Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri districts in East Pakistan: During the 1947 partition of the Indian subcontinent, the All India Muslim League advocated for awarding the Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri districts in East Pakistan, citing the geopolitical and ecological importance of the Teesta River basin. This demand was opposed by the Indian National Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha. Ultimately, the Boundary Commission (BC), led by Sir Cyril Radcliffe, awarded the districts to India, primarily because they were non-Muslim-majority areas. At the time, Darjeeling's Muslim population was 2.42%, Jalpaiguri's was 23.02%, while the League's claim was based on "other factors".
The lost geopolitical leverage for both Bangladesh and Sikkim: Concurrently, Sikkim was an independent country, bordering the Tibet Autonomous Region of China to the north and northeast, Bhutan to the east, Nepal's Koshi Province to the west, and the Indian state of West Bengal to the south. Its proximity to the strategically important Siliguri Corridor, which borders Bangladesh, is noteworthy. Had Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri been incorporated into East Pakistan, Bangladesh would have shared a border with independent Sikkim.
India's long-term strategy involved incorporating Sikkim as a buffer or vassal state against China, similar to British colonial practices, and exploiting its substantial natural resources, particularly its hydropower potential. An independent Sikkim bordering Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) and China could have potentially safeguarded its independence and provided Bangladesh with greater geopolitical leverage. Bangladesh, as a friendly neighbor, could have offered security guarantees to an independent and sovereign Sikkim.
Furthermore, as a landlocked state, Sikkim could have utilized Bangladesh's port facilities in the Bay of Bengal, fostering mutually beneficial international trade. Conversely, Bangladesh could have gained direct access to China, Nepal, and Bhutan through Sikkim, tapping into their market potential and mitigating security threats from India. This arrangement could have also benefited Sikkim, Nepal, and Bhutan by creating a sub-regional bloc to counter potential Indian assertiveness.
The history of independent Sikkim: Sikkim's history as an independent entity began in 1642 with the coronation of its first Chogyal (King), Phuntsog Namgyal, by three prominent lamas from western Sikkim. The king and the lamas subsequently annexed the Chumbi Valley (present-day Darjeeling) and parts of eastern Nepal. The Chogyal established a 12-minister administration, dividing the kingdom into 12 districts. While disputes persisted among the Tibetan communities of Bhutia, Lepcha, Limbu, and Magar, the Magar eventually left the kingdom after a battle.
The Namgyal dynasty, founded in 1642, established Sikkim as a Buddhist kingdom with strong cultural and religious connections to Tibet. Rooted in Tibetan traditions, Sikkim was considered a "beyul" (sacred land) blessed by Guru Rinpoche. Tibetan Buddhist masters frequently visited the kingdom, and it maintained ties with Tibetan institutions such as Tashilhunpo. The kingdom enjoyed a period of peace until invasions by Nepal and Bhutan disrupted its stability.
However, with the advent of British rule in India, Sikkim allied with Britain against their common adversary, Nepal. This alliance was followed by a Nepalese attack on Sikkim and the subsequent Anglo-Nepalese War in 1814.
Annexation of Sikkim by British India and opening of trade route through Sikkim to Tibet: Following treaties between Nepal and the British, the British sought to establish a trade route through Sikkim to Tibet, an extension of the Silk Road. This initiative aimed to counter Russia's growing influence in Tibet.
Despite that, the Sikkim-India relations were strained due to new British taxation in the Morang region and further weakened after Britain's annexation of Darjeeling in 1835, which became part of British Sikkim. Despite these developments, independent Sikkim continued to exist alongside British Sikkim. In 1888, Britain militarily intervened in Sikkim during a conflict with Tibet over territorial disputes, establishing a residency in Gangtok in 1889 and thereby assuming control over Sikkim's foreign affairs and internal administration.
The appointment of John Claude White as the Political Officer of Sikkim in 1889 marked a turning point. White, a British Indian civil servant, served in Sikkim, then a British Protectorate under the Treaty of Tumlong (1861). The British strategically exploited Sikkim's location for trade with Tibet, annexing Darjeeling and encouraging Nepali migration, which led to demographic changes that later destabilized the Buddhist monarchy.
The Convention of 1890 and Teesta River watershed: The Convention of 1890 between Britain and China delineated Sikkim's border with Tibet along the Teesta River watershed, further solidifying British control.
Serving British strategic interests: By 1890, British dominance over Sikkim's foreign policy was formalized, setting a precedent for India's post-1947 influence. Under figures like White, the British restructured Sikkim's administration, introducing modern bureaucratic systems, centralizing governance, and developing infrastructure, such as roads, to facilitate military movement. While indirect rule allowed some autonomy for local elites in internal affairs, Britain maintained complete control over defense and foreign policy. British influence also spurred Nepali migration into southern Sikkim for labor, altering the state's demographic composition and contributing to ethnic tensions that persisted in later periods.
In essence, British policies transformed Sikkim from an independent Himalayan kingdom into a dependent protectorate, serving British strategic interests by securing trade routes to Tibet and countering regional threats from Nepal and China. The British consistently thwarted Nepal's attempts to gain influence in Sikkim's politics.
For instance, during the anti-British sentiment in Sikkim, Kathmandu sought to align with the Sikkimese monarchy or anti-British factions. The British countered these efforts by reinforcing their political control in Sikkim through diplomatic pressure or military intervention. During the Dogra-Tibetan War (1841–42) and Nepal's war with Tibet (1855–56), the British ensured Sikkim's political isolation by preventing its alignment with Nepal or other regional powers.
Sikkim as a British buffer: The opening of the trade route through Sikkim to Tibet diverted Indo-Tibetan trade from traditional Nepalese routes, weakening Kathmandu's economic influence. The annexation of Darjeeling and control over trade routes through Sikkim enabled the British to maintain a strong presence in the Eastern Himalayas while limiting direct contact between British India and potentially hostile entities like Nepal or Tibet.
Ultimately, through various means, including treaties, territorial annexations, demographic engineering, and diplomatic maneuvering, the British effectively utilized Sikkim as a buffer state to contain Nepal's ambitions and secure their northeastern frontier.
Regained independence status of Sikkim: In 1918, Sikkim regained its independent status, including a security guarantee from British rule. However, in 1950, India and Sikkim signed a treaty making Sikkim an Indian Protectorate, with India assuming responsibility for defense, foreign affairs, and communications. This arrangement stemmed from:
● Geopolitical
concerns following China's 1949 annexation of Tibet.
● Historical
vulnerabilities to Nepalese and Bhutanese incursions.
● The desire of a small ethnic Bhutia-Lepcha elite for Indian protection against demographic changes, as the population was approximately 63% Nepali-origin by the 1970s.
The Sikkim in map
Indian security interest: Sikkim's strategic location between China, Nepal, and Bhutan was crucial for India, particularly after China annexed Tibet in 1950 and the 1962 Sino-Indian War. India perceived Sikkim as a buffer state against potential Chinese aggression. The Chogyal (monarch) Palden Thondup Namgyal's efforts to assert autonomy clashed with India's security priorities. Allegations of the Chogyal's closeness to foreign powers, including claims that his American wife, Hope Cooke, was a CIA agent, heightened Indian concerns about external influence in Sikkim.
Domestic
unrest in Sikkim and the R&AW: By the early 1970s, Sikkim experienced
significant internal unrest due to tensions between the monarchy and
pro-democracy forces led by Kazi Lhendup Dorjee. The vast majority of the
Nepali-origin population felt politically marginalized under the monarchy,
fueling demands for democratic reforms. India actively supported pro-democracy
and pro-merger factions in Sikkim.
The Research and Analysis Wing
(R&AW), India's external intelligence agency, played a crucial role in
unifying these groups and organizing political opposition to the monarchy under
Kazi Lhendup Dorjee's leadership.
Dorjee collaborated closely with Indian officials and intelligence agencies, aligning his pro-democracy agenda with India's strategic interests.
R&AW provided financial and political support to Dorjiee's party to weaken the Chogyal's position. Indian authorities reportedly informed Dorjee that they would merge Sikkim with India if he could secure overwhelming public and legislative support, a detail he kept confidential until the final stages of the process.
The covert operation of R&AW: R&AW initiated a two-year covert operation in February 1973, aiming to integrate Sikkim into India. This operation involved a small team of officers, including G.B.S. Sidhu, who worked under R&AW's founder, Rameshwar Nath Kao, and regional director P.N. Banerjee.
R&AW supported agitations against the Chogyal, using code names like "Janamat" and "Twilight" for operations involving leaders like Kazi and KC Pradhan. These movements were encouraged to pressure the Chogyal into seeking Indian assistance.
The Indian intelligence agency ensured that these movements remained active and gained momentum, paving the way for a referendum to decide Sikkim's future.
R&AW monitored and countered perceived external influences, such as alleged CIA involvement through Chogyal's American wife, Hope Cooke. They also kept tabs on diplomatic visits, like those from the U.S. Consulate in Calcutta, to prevent any international support for the Chogyal.
During the final stage of the merger, R&AW worked to ensure a peaceful transition by disarming the Sikkim guards and preventing any violent resistance from the Chogyal's loyalists.
R&AW's role was pivotal in orchestrating the political and social conditions that led to Sikkim's integration into India, ensuring a strategic alignment with Indian interests while navigating complex geopolitical dynamics.
The Indian direct intervention in Sikkim and loss of independence: Indian troops intervened during the 1973 protests at the Chogyal’s request. However, that subsequently bolstered anti-monarchy forces. This paved the way for elections in 1974, which were won by Kazi Lhendup Dorjee's pro-merger Sikkim Congress.
In April 1975, a referendum was held under Indian oversight, with 97.5% voting to abolish the monarchy and merge with India. Critics argue that the process lacked transparency and was influenced by Indian authorities.
Later, following a referendum, India amended its constitution to annex Sikkim as its 22nd state on May 16, 1975.
END
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fazlous Satter is an author, advanced professional data analytics, and human rights & geopolitical researcher from Bangladesh.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The author can be directly reached at: fazloussatter@yahoo.com,fazloussatter@gmail.com
No comments:
Post a Comment