Strategic Importance of the Siliguri Corridor and the India-China Border Conflict

Fazlous Satter

The Siliguri Corridor is a narrow stretch of land located in West Bengal connecting the Indian mainland to the northeastern states Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, Nagaland, Tripura, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh, and the Sikkim (which was an independent state for a long time and later became a vassal state in 1950 and eventually lost it sovereignty and incorporated as an Indian state in 1975). The 60-kilometer long and 22-kilometer wide Siliguri Corridor is often called the "Chicken's Neck". Due to its limited passage and vulnerability to foreign attack, militarily this corridor is also referred to as the choking point.

Siliguri is situated in the foothills of the Himalayas Range which is the 2^nd largest city of Indian state West Bengal. The river Mahanadi divides Siliguri City into two halves. The city is bounded by jungles with noticeable wildlife and many other natural features like rivers and mountains.

It lies in the Chumbi Valley of the Chinese-Tibetan Autonomous Region that is contiguous to the Indian States of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh specifically. This narrow stretch of land amidst three countries Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh serves as the lifeline for the seven sister states of northeast India.

Being unique and too narrow it is only 10 km away from Nepal and 40 km from Bhutan and Bangladesh just adjacent to it. The corridor is also close to China through Chumbi Valley. Siliguri is designated as an entrance not only for Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh but also is a logistics base for the region and thus is an attraction for all.

The climate and geological features

Being part of the high-altitude Himalaya Range, the climate remains cold most of the year ranging from 7 to -9 degrees Celsius from December to January. In the summer season from May to June temperature seldom crosses 35 degrees Celsius. The climate is much suited for tea plantations and the corridor is bounded by tea gardens. The Siliguri city is in the vicinity of many fault lines which cause most of the earthquakes. The highest level of the recorded earthquake was measured in 1988 up to 9.7 on the Richter scale. It is interesting to note that the earthquake which occurred in 2011 lasted for a noticeable period of four minutes and seventeen seconds.

The Treaty of Siliguri between British India and Nepal

According to Hasan Yaser Malik of Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport (UK) Siliguri, which means a pile of pebbles, has been a transit spot between Darjeeling and Karseong since the conclusion of the "Treaty of Siliguri" between British India and Nepal in 1816. South of Siliguri, Phansideoa was a port that had an agreement with Maldah, thereby with other areas of Bengal and Bihar. The Sikkimese and Bhutanese have been using the Mahanadi to transport their merchandise to Phansideoa Port since the eighteenth century.

Siliguri progressively established into a small town once the British occupied Darjeeling in 1835. The significance of the area was enhanced further once the British East India Company established a railway line to Northeast India that continuously increased the number of immigrants from Nepal, Bhutan, and the Seven Sister States while the number of the original residents of Siliguri City; the Rajbangshis, was decreasing daily. In 1947, the partition of India and the emergence of East Pakistan flagged the pathway of Siliguri becoming a significant transit spot and the strategically imperative area which led to the rise of the immigrant population mainly from erstwhile East Bengal, Nepal, Bhutan, Seven Sister States, Bihar and Jharkhand in search of livelihood.

The demographic features of Siliguri

As per the records of 2011, the population of Siliguri city comprised 705,579 individuals with 51 percent being male population. The majority of Siliguri's population is Bengali; other chief minorities include Gurkhas, Rajbangshis, Meitei, Bodo Biharis, and Marwaris speaking mainly Bengali, Hindi, English, and Nepali languages. However, the locals of Siliguri Rajbangshis people speak Tibetan languages.

A hub for regional trade, commerce, and tourism

The Siliguri region is important for trade, commerce, and tourism for West Bengal, Sikkim, Assam, Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. All land trade between the North East and the rest of India happens through this corridor.

Siliguri is also provided educational facilities to students from West Bengal, Sikkim, Bihar, and Assam and the bordering countries of Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bhutan. It is especially applicable for the low-cost English medium school education since the colonial era.

A strategic hub of Indian rail and road network

The Siliguri corridor is the hub of a rail and road network connecting West Bengal and the rest of India to the North East, including Assam, Nagaland, and Sikkim. It is also the hub of the railway network that connects to the strategic military formations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

From the New Jalpaiguri Junction Railway Station (NJP), different rail links emerge to connect the three important military formations located right opposite China.

From the NJP station, a rail link moves towards Guwahati in Assam. It is from here that a road network moves towards the strategically important Tawang town in Arunachal Pradesh, according to regional experts, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) separating India and China is merely 25 km away from Tawang. This road and rail network provides essential supplies to the Indian Army’s 4 Corps (having a strength of about 60,000 troops) responsible for the defense of the Tawang district.

From the NJP station, a rail link also heads towards Dimapur in Nagaland and Dibrugarh in Upper Assam. From here roads move towards the rest of Nagaland and western Arunachal respectively. This network serves the Army’s 3 Corps, also consisting of the same number of men as 4 Corps.

The railway network also caters to the requirements of 33 Corps, which has its military formations based in Sikkim.

The Indian deployment at Siliguri Corridor

The corridor has major airbases: Bagdogra and Hashimara and an upcoming Army aviation base at Shaugaon. A large number of Indian Army and Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) installations are located in this narrow stretch. In keeping with the ‘one border, one force’ policy, the responsibility of borders is divided between the Indian Army and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) for China; Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) for Nepal and Bhutan, and Bangladesh with Border Security Force (BSF.) The multiplicity of forces and agencies requires an effective and tailor-made coordination mechanism. Most of the border except for Bangladesh is un-fenced and porous with treacherous riverine stretches. Tea, timber, and tourism are the main drivers of economic activity, controlled by Siliguri.

Strategic Importance of the Siliguri Corridor

The Siliguri Corridor is a strategically important and highly sensitive territory. Wedged between Bangladesh to the south and the west and China to the north, the Siliguri Corridor also links India to neighboring Nepal, Bangladesh, and Bhutan.

The whole North-Eastern states of India is geographically isolated from the rest of India and is connected to the mainland through this Siliguri Corridor. The corridor extends from the Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, and Terai areas of West Bengal towards the North East.

The corridor itself is a geographical deformity, often referred to as the “cartographic relic of the British decolonization process”. The Corridor now has separated a population of about 50 million from the mainland of India. Wedged between Bangladesh to the south and west and hostile China to the north, the region has no access to the sea closer than Kolkata, on the other side of the corridor. Between Sikkim and Bhutan lies the Chumbi Valley, a dagger-like slice of Tibetan territory.

Strategically, the Siliguri corridor is also considered as the Achilles heel in the defense of almost 2000 kilometers of Indian borders with China and Myanmar. According to the military strategists, this 2,000 sq km stretch of land would be the prime and early target of any event of any war.

Siliguri Corridor with low hills, jungles and broken ground dotted with numerous rivers provides multiple formidable defense lines.

Apart from that several armed insurgent groups including the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) have been using the corridor for their movement for a long time. The emergence of the Rajbangshis insurgent outfit, the Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO), is also adding to the worries of Indian security forces here. The presence of KLO along with Gurkha nationalism and their demand for a Gurkhaland also have made this region a target for hybrid warfare.

The Siliguri Corridor and China-India border conflict

Siliguri Corridor lies in the Chumbi Valley of the Chinese Tibetan Autonomous Region that is contiguous to the Indian States of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh specifically.

By an advance of just 130 kilometers, the Chinese military could cut off Bhutan, West Bengal, and the northeastern states of India. About 50 million people in northeast India would be separated from the mainland of India.

Indian defense annalist thinks that threat to the Siliguri corridor is perennial as China has continued its overt road and airstrip construction activities on its side of the border. This could allow China to rapidly mobilize and deploy troops thereby threatening the Siliguri corridor. Furthermore, the deployment of artillery, missiles, or anti-aircraft weaponry could easily jeopardize India's efforts to resupply the region in the time of war, especially considering that there is only a single railway line through the region to NE states.

From the Indian perspective, China, which already claimed the whole of 83,743 square kilometers (32,333 sq miles) territory of the Arunachal Pradesh has been a perennial threat to the Siliguri Corridor. The predominantly Buddhist Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh shares a border with China, which continues to claim the state as a part of its Tibet Autonomous Region. It is an ethnically diverse state, with predominantly Monpa people in the west, Tani people in the center, Tai people in the east, and Naga people in the south of the state. It should be noted that during the 1962 Sino-Indian War, most of Arunachal Pradesh was temporarily captured by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA).

Some defense annalist even thinks that the Chinese have an opportunity to create seven different Bangladesh in north-east India. Among the disadvantages that India faces in its defensive posture vis-a-vis China is that many of the infrastructure projects of roads and bridges initiated have been delayed by the difficulties of the terrain and the inadequacy of heavy-lift helicopters to deliver civil engineering material to the building sites. By the very nature of its geography, the Siliguri Corridor is indefensible with static obstacles and firepower.

In addition to these, the road being constructed by China in the Doklam plateau will ensure that in a conflict it will block the Siliguri Corridor and cut off the North East. This would also lead to the cutting off of three primary military formations and their units, drastically reducing the supply of equipment and reinforcements to them.

It should be noted that the Chinese strategic assets near the Doklam plateau have increased over the years with the upgrading of the road from Lhasa to Yadong (near the plateau), which allows the 500 km journey to be made in just seven hours. China is also working on extending the Beijing-Lhasa high-speed railway line to Yadong. This enhances China’s military logistics in the region opposite the Siliguri Corridor. If the road in Doklam is connected to Yadong, it would add to the enhancement in China’s capabilities in choking the corridor.

However, some Indian experts point out that China's road and rail network in the Chumbi Valley will be vulnerable to artillery shelling and air attacks from either Sikkim or Bhutan. Therefore, if China blocks the Siliguri Corridor by sending its army on the road it plans to construct in Doklam, it may not be able to sustain itself for too long. Also, the force levels that China will have to commit to operations in this sector will be at the cost of operations in other sectors.

It should be noted that the China-India border has three sections: the western sector between Ladakh and the Chinese-held Aksai Chin, the central sector, and the eastern sector dividing Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh states from Tibet.

The Siliguri Corridor and Bhutan factor

According to an article of Dr. Monika Kannan, published in the Imperial Journal of Interdisciplinary Research (IJIR), a Chinese military advance of fewer than 80 miles (130 km) would cut off Bhutan, part of West Bengal, and all of North-East India, an area containing almost 50 million people. This situation arose during the war between India and China in 1962.

Since the 1962 war with China, Indian strategists have envisioned a future scenario where the Chinese may simply bypass and drop Special Forces to choke the vulnerable Siliguri Corridor and cut off the Northeast. Chinese diplomacy with Bhutan gives reason to take this possibility seriously; since 1996, China began a concerted diplomatic effort to yield a border claim with Bhutan in exchange for the Doklam Plateau. The territorial swap with Bhutan would place in Chinese hands the key to India’s choke point in the Siliguri.

According to Dr. Monika Kannan, it seems that India is apprehensive due to emerging ties between Bhutan and China wherein China and Bhutan both are resolving their territorial issues mutually. Apart from that, any land linkage between China and Myanmar can serve a prudent economic and diplomatic opportunity for Bhutan and the deprived Indian citizens of the Seven Sister States due to which Indians may lose a trusted and dependent friend like Bhutan.

The Siliguri Corridor and Nepal factor

The distance between Nepal and the Siliguri Corridor is just 10 kilometers. Nepal uses the Siliguri Corridor for its trade, commerce, and tourism with Bangladesh, Bhutan, and India. Previously Nepal was known as the only Hindu Kingdom of the world and that maintained deep friendly relations with neighbor India. Therefore, Nepali and Indian citizens can still visit each other's country without having any visa.

But recently the situation has changed a lot due to its dispute over the land boundary. Nepal's foreign policy has now shifted towards the Chinese sphere. That turned former friendly relations of these two countries into adversary in terms of geopolitical interest.

By considering this reality, the influence of ethnically Nepali Gurkha in the Siliguri Corridor and their demand for Gurkhaland became a matter of concern for the Indian security establishment.

It should be mentioned that Gurkhas are known as a fearless soldier. Historically, they served in the Nepali, Indian and British Army. Once former Indian Army Chief of Staff Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw said that: "If a man says he is not afraid of dying, he is either lying or he is a Gurkha."

The Siliguri Corridor and Bangladesh factor

The Siliguri Corridor has measured approximately 12,203 sq km. The narrowest 4 km strip towards the western edge, the Tetulia corridor is wedged between Nepal and Bangladesh. The eastern part of the Corridor is wider and borders Bhutan and Bangladesh. The Chumbi valley tapering into Dolam/Dokalam plateau is barely 100 km away.

According to the strategic defense analysts, in the event of a large scale outbreak of war between India and China, the active or passive support of Bangladesh would have an immense impact, especially by considering the proximity of the Indian Siliguri Corridor and any possible Chinese attack from the northeastern frontier or adjacent Bhutan border. Essentially the fall or collapse of the Siliguri Corridor (Chicken's Neck) would result in the complete disruption of communication between India and the rest of its Seven Sister States, other than by the most expensive option – AIR.

By considering this possible scenario on October 10^th, 2019 Indian news media Times of India published an article of Mohinder Pal Singh titled “ What if China wrings India's 'Chicken's Neck' – the Siliguri corridor? Here are some countermeasures".In that article author mentioned three possible options for India to counter the Chines effort to cut off the Siliguri Corridor from the rest of India. The following are those options:

The first option for India is to enter into a treaty with Bangladesh permitting not only transit of military equipment during times of conflict but also civilian traffic and trade activities. This would add a layer of strategic depth in the region and alleviate (in some measure) concerns of the possible severance of the north-east with the mainland.

The second option is to strengthen connectivity to the tri-junction area at Doka La so that Indian response as well as surveillance capability is augmented.

The third option is to make alternate transport arrangements that are safe and secure within India itself. The development of a multi-modal transport corridor through Siliguri itself can be undertaken by India. As part of this initiative, India can even build underground road tunnels which are less likely to be susceptible to air and artillery attack in a time of a military conflict.

If we consider the above-mentioned article, it is quite clear that in any event of war between India and China or in case of any Chinese effort of cut off this choking point India may pursue Bangladesh to turn its existing civil transit/ connectivity facilities into a military one. If Bangladesh denies India military transit/connectivity access through its territory against its investment and strategic partner China that may bring a catastrophic situation for Indian defense. On the other hand, if Bangladesh succumbed to the Indian pressure; then part of Bangladesh would be a risk of turning into a battlefield of the China-India war.

However, politically the current regime of Bangladesh enjoys an exceptional relationship with India in a time when India is suffering from silent diplomatic isolation from most of its South-Asian neighbors. Therefore, by taking advantage of political rapport, India was enjoying many geopolitical dividends.

But the situation changed with the Chinese tens of $ billion investment promise along with existing investment in the various mega project in Bangladesh which made a sharp contrast with the Indian implementation process of NRC branding its Bangla speaking Muslim population as a citizen of Bangladesh with the immense threat of expulsion as a part of its anti-Muslim xenophobia. It also acted against Bangladesh in the Rohingya crisis to counterbalance China in Burma.

Apart from the submarine purchases from China, India is also concerned about the recent Chinese proposed loan worth $938.27 million to implement the proposed ‘Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project’ that has created resentment among Indian political as well as defense establishment.

India considers this Chinese loan proposal as an effort of geopolitical maneuvering near the Siliguri Corridor. However, for a long time, India deprived downstream country Bangladesh of its just share of water from this common river despite its repeated promise.

With the shift in the regional scenario, Bangladesh is now in a balancing rope between its political alliance with big neighbor India and strategic and investment partner China.

But a recent move from Pakistan to normalize relations with Bangladesh is also considered by many Indian analysts as a reflection of the strategic shift toward China.

Therefore, any break out of the war between two regional power China and India would be a great danger for Bangladesh both in terms of overall trade, investment, and supply of consumer products as well as national defense and security.

September 22, 2020

Fazlous Satter is a human rights and human security activist & researcher from Bangladesh. He authored “UNDERSTANDING THE WORLD’S LONGEST CIVIL WAR: COLONIAL STATE FORMATIONS, GEOPOLITICS, CONFLICT OVER NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE GENOCIDE"

 

India-China Border Conflict: A Great Danger for South Asia

Fazlous Satter

The border dispute between two giant neighbor and nuclear power China and India has created a great risk of fallout in South Asia both in the military, geopolitical as well as economic terms that can bring the catastrophic situation in the whole region and even beyond. The revocation of the Article-370 of the Indian constitution that granted the special status of Kashmir, the publication of a new border map by Delhi is also added fuel in this process. By considering the Pakistan-China in-tangled strategic relation and the so-called Indian surgical operation inside Pakistan has created fear of large scale conflict/war among three nuclear power; India on one side and China and Pakistan on the other end.

However, presumably with the Russian initiative, both sides sat on a sideline of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO)'s defense ministers meeting that resulted in a five points joint announcement to ease the escalating border tension between two major Asian military power crated a bit hope of de-escalation.

Despite this five-point joint statement in Moscow, by considering the previous records and results of such border talk and geopolitical agenda of both sides it seems to be too early to certain that the risk of further escalation is evaporated. Therefore, in this article, I have briefly described the historical perspectives of this border tensions along with the facts that learned the reader needs to consider to understand the potential risk that may engulf South Asia in any event of Indo-China full-scale war.

The Colonial border and the India-China war of 1962

China and India shared the wold's largest unmarked border. Both have territorial claims over 3,488 kilometers (2,169 miles) Line of Actual Control (LAC) and beyond. In 1914 Britain and Tibet signed a treaty at Simla Convention separating India and Tibet which is known as a McMahon Line. But China never recognized this treaty and it claimed a further 90,0000 square kilometer border further south. According to China Tibet had never been an independent state when it signed the Simla Convention.

In 1962 both nations had a war over the territorial claim over Aksai Chin which is slightly larger than Portugal with a total 37,244 squire kilometer territory and above 4,300-meter sea level that caused the life of more than 4000 Indian and 700 Chinese troops. Aksai Chin is part of Xingjiang province. Aksai-Xinjiang Highway is the main Chinese artery of Tibet.

The other disputed territory lies south of the McMahon Line, formerly known as the North-East Frontier Agency, and now called Arunachal Pradesh. As of 2020, India continues to maintain that the McMahon Line is the legal border in the east that China never accepted.

After the Sino-Indian war of 1962, there was a brief border clash in 1967 in the region of Sikkim. In 1987 and 2013, potential conflicts over the two differing Lines of Actual Control were successfully de-escalated.

The Doklam standoff

In 2017, China and India got into a major standoff in Doklam that lasted 73 days. On 16 June 2017 Chinese troops with construction vehicles and road-building equipment began extending an existing road southward in Doklam, near a tri-junction border area, known as Donglang, or Donglang Caochang (meaning Donglang pasture or grazing field), in Chinese; a territory which is claimed by both China as well as India's ally and Chines neighbor Bhutan. On 18 June 2017, as part of Operation Juniper, about 270 Indian troops armed with weapons and two bulldozers crossed the Sikkim border into Doklam to stop the Chinese troops from constructing the road.

This 73 days long military standoff between the Indian Army and the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) created a fear of further escalation of conflict and risk of war. According to the New York Times, the Doklam standoff encountered more Bhutanese people concerned about India's actions than China's. It found expressions of sovereignty and concern that an escalation of the border conflict would hurt trade and diplomatic relations with China.

After issuing a press statement on 29 June 2017, the Bhutanese government and media maintained a studious silence. The Bhutanese clarified that the territory on which China was building a road was "Bhutanese territory" that was being claimed by China, and it is part of the ongoing border negotiations. It also defended the policy of silence followed by the Bhutanese government, saying "Bhutan does not want India and China to go to war, and it is avoiding doing anything that can heat an already heated situation.

On 28 August 2017 both India and China announced that they had withdrawn all their troops from the face-off site in Doklam.

From the Indian side it is being alleged that since the Doklam standoff China has increased its military presence in the Tibetan Plateau; and also stationed fighter jets at the Ngari Gunsa Airport, which is 200 kilometers (124 miles) from Pangong Tso, Ladakh.

The Standoff at Pangong Tso

Since 5 May 2020, Chinese and Indian troops have engaged in aggressive melee, face-offs, and skirmishes at locations along the Sino-Indian border, including near the disputed Pangong Lake in Ladakh and the Tibet Autonomous Region, and near the border between Sikkim and the Tibet Autonomous Region. Additional clashes also took place at locations in eastern Ladakh along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

A video showed soldiers from both nations engaging in fistfights and stone-pelting along the LAC. On 10/11 May, another clash took place. Some soldiers on both sides had sustained injuries.

The Galwan Valley skirmish

On 15 June 2020 Indian and Chinese troops clashed for six hours in a steep section of a mountainous region in the Galwan Valley. The immediate cause of the incident is unknown, with both sides releasing contradictory official statements in the aftermath. Beijing said that Indian troops had attacked Chinese troops first, while on 18 June Indian newspaper The Hindu quoted a "senior government official" in the Ministry of External Affairs of India who said their troops were ambushed with dammed rivulets being released and boulders being thrown by Chinese troops. The statement said this happened while they were patrolling a disputed area where Colonel Santosh Babu had destroyed a Chinese tent two days earlier. While soldiers carry firearms, due to decades of tradition designed to reduce the possibility of an escalation, agreements disallow usage of firearms, but the Chinese side is reported to possess iron rods and clubs. As a result, hand-to-hand combat broke out, and the Indians called for reinforcements from a post about 2 miles (3.2 km) away. Eventually, up to 600 men were engaged in combat using stones, batons, iron rods, and other makeshift weapons. The fighting, which took place in near-total darkness, lasted for up to six hours. According to senior Indian military officers, Chinese troops used batons wrapped in barbed wire and clubs embedded with nails

According to Indian media reports, melee fighting on 15/16 June 2020 resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers (including an officer) and casualties of 43 Chinese soldiers (including the death of an officer). It was the first fatalities along the LAC in at least 45 years. Media reports stated that soldiers were taken captive on both sides and released in the coming few days.

In late May, Chinese forces objected to Indian road construction in the Galwan River valley. On 25 July, news reports emerged of disengagement at Galwan, Hot Springs, and Gogra.

In late August 2020 Indian Chief of Defense Staff General Bipin Rawat threatened military options to deal with the transgression by the Chinese army in the Ladakh area on, if the ongoing diplomatic and military talks with China don't yield any result.

The Indian night time stealth operation at the southern shore of Pangong Tso

On 29–30 August, the skirmishes expanded to the southern shore of Pangong Tso near the Ladakhi village of Chushul. An Indian Army spokesperson said that the PLA had made provocative military movements on the night of 29/30 August along the southern bank and that they were preempted by an Indian response without any violence occurring. The Indian Defense Ministry also stated that Indian forces had foiled China's attempts at intruding.

But according to a report of Bloomberg News, published on September 3, 2020, thereof refers to the Indian official sources claimed that it was the India which triggered the latest clash with China on their Himalayan border by executing a stealth night-time operation to claim strategic outposts offering a clear view of troops movement in disputed territory,

The report whereby quoited the Indian official sources called it as the Indian first offensive since the conflict began in May 2020 in which thousands of Indian soldiers climbed up mountain peaks for about six hours to claim the vantage points along the south bank of Pangong Tso-a glacial lake roughly the size of Singapore. The action was taken by what India saw an intrusion by Chinese forces.

The decision to capture high ground which was previously unoccupied along the 3,488 kilometers (2,169 miles) Line of Actual Control (LAC) revived a conflict that had been largely dormant since June.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian also denied any intrusion by PLA into Indian territory. Zhang Shuili, the Western Theater Command spokesman, on the other hand, accused the Indian military of provocation and violating China's territorial sovereignty.

The Moscow Talk

Amid this heightened border tension, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh and his Chinese counterpart Gen. Wei Fenghe held talks in Moscow on 4^th September 2020 at the sideline of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO) defense ministers meeting to ease escalating border tension in eastern Ladakh. It was the first high-level meeting between the two sides after the border row erupted along the Line of Actual Control(LAC) in eastern Ladakh in early May of this year. During this sideline talk, both sides agreed to deescalate the situation.

But a few days after this Moscow meeting China has accused Indian troops of illegally crossing a disputed Himalayan border and firing "provocative" warning shots at patrolling soldiers.

China's military said its soldiers were "forced to take countermeasures", though it is not clear what they were. India rejected the allegations and accused Chinese troops of firing in the air during the face-off in the high-altitude Ladakh region.

According to Chinese state media outlet the Global Times, the Indian troops had "illegally crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC) into the Shenpao mountain region near the south bank of Pangong Tso Lake", quoting senior colonel Zhang Shuili, a spokesperson of the PLA.

It should be noted that under an agreement signed between China and India in 1996 both countries bar the use of guns and explosives from the Line of Actual Control, as the disputed border is known, although soldiers have clashed there before. Both countries maintained this agreement until this alleged incident, even though there were dozens of death and causalities in recent skirmishes.

Therein on 10^th September 2020, China's State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization foreign ministers' meeting in Moscow on the evening and the meeting lasted nearly three hours. The highly anticipated meeting was viewed by experts from both sides as a last resort to peacefully resolve the recent border clashes, after previous meetings at the commander levels as well as last week's defense ministers' meeting in Moscow failed to garner true results.

In this meeting, both parties reached a five-point agreement to de-escalate the situation and disengagement.

It should be noted that India and China had at least 20 formal border talk but yet to resolved its disputed claim that remains a potential source of tension between two neighboring countries.

The China’s perception concerning India’s strategy

From the Chinese point of view, India thinks the current international environment, particularly the Sino-US hostility is an opportunity for them. Therefore, they are trying to take this advantage to redraw the map of its border. In their consideration, the current regime of the United States is openly supporting India and provoking a conflict between giant neighbors to further enhance its dominance in this region.

China also serious concern about the revocation of the Article-370 of the Indian Constitution that granted the special status of Kashmir. They think this revocation is a part of a long term strategy to occupy other parts of Kashmir as well as Aksai Chin, in the long run, that may create a great threat for Chinese territorial integrity and sovereignty.

These Chinese concerns further increased by the Indian alliance with Australia, Japan, and Vietnam to counter the Chinese sphere of influence as a part of the US Indo-Pacific strategy.

The Chinese neighbor in South Asia

Apart from India, China has a direct border with South Asian country Afghanistan, Bhutan, Nepal, and. Pakistan.

The border between Afghanistan and China is a 76-kilometer-long (47 miles) beginning at the tri-point of both countries with Pakistan administrated region of Kashmir (Gilgit-Baltistan), following the watershed along the Mustagh Range, and ending at the tripoint with Tajikistan.

The border between Bhutan and China is a sinuous line of 470 km (290 miles) long, in a north-south-east direction, which separates Bhutan to the south from Tibet, an autonomous region of China, to the north. It lies between two tripoints formed by the two countries with India.

The border between China and Nepal is 1,414 kilometers (879 miles) in length along with the mountain range the Himalayas and extends northwest-southeast direction, separating the south of Tibet Autonomous Region of China and the territory of Nepal. This border passes through the highest peak in the world, Mount Everest.

Throughout history, Nepalis traded with the Tibetans via the many border crossings.[citation needed] One of the most important goods traded was salt from the Tibetan areas.

The border between Nepal and China is one of the most natural boundaries of the earth, due to the barrier Himalayas.

The people's Republic of China and the Kingdom of Nepal had a brief border dispute shortly before 1960. They resolved this by officially signing a border agreement in 1961.

While not disputed between Nepal and China, western China–Nepal–India tri-point is disputed between Nepal and India. In 2015, the Nepalese parliament objected to the agreement between India and China to trade through Lipulekh stating that 'it violates Nepal's sovereign rights over the disputed territory'. After the Indian prime minister's visit to China in 2015, India and China agreed to open a trading post in Lipulekh, raising objections from Nepal. Nepal intended to resolve the issue via diplomatic means with India.

In 2012, Nepal and China agreed to open new ports of entry, to a total of 6 official ports. Three of the ports are designated as international ports, while three others are only designated for bilateral trade.

The border crossing between Zhangmu and Kodari on the Friendship Highway has been in operation since 1968. In 2014, the border crossing at Rasuwa Fort (Rasuwagadhi) was opened for commerce. However, this crossing is not open to foreigners until 2017. Besides, this border crossing is being considered for a future rail crossing between the two countries.

Other crossings like the one at Burang-Hilsa near the western tri-point while not widely accessible has been used for local trade between China and Nepal for many years. Some of those crossings have gotten so important for local trade that in 2008 when the Chinese tightened its border control during the Olympics, villages like Kimathanka faced food shortages due to disruption of local trade. Historically, there are even more border crossings. The crossing at Kora La between Upper Mustang and Tibet for example was a major salt trade route. However, this crossing was closed due to Tibetan guerrillas in the 1960s. It remains closed for most of the year to this day, except when opening for limited local trade during the semiannual cross-border trade fairs.

The China–Pakistan border is 592 kilometers (368 miles) and runs west-east from the tri-junction with Afghanistan to the disputed tripoint with India in the vicinity of the Siachen Glacier. It traverses the Karakorum Mountains, one of the world's tallest mountain ranges. Hunza District, Shigar District, and Ghanche District in Gilgit-Baltistan administered by Pakistan border Taxkorgan Tajik Autonomous County and Kargilik/Yecheng County in Kashgar Prefecture, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, China.

A great danger for South Asia

Most of the South Asian countries have strong trade, economic and military ties with China. They are also dependent on Chinese raw materials, consumer products, military hardware, industrial technology, and investment. Therefore, any full-scale war between India and China obviously will create a great risk of disruption in the south Asian market and the economy as a whole along with defense supply.

From the Indian point of view, China has been increasing its footprint with India's neighbors – Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan; so from India having a monopoly in the region, China is now posing a direct challenge to New Delhi's influence in South Asia.

The China-India border conflict and Pakistan

Pakistan is an arch-rival of India and is considered as the all-weather friend of China. Both nuclear power countries have a border dispute with India and had a war with the common enemy India in 1962 and 1965 respectively.

As the Ladakh and Aksai Chin is practically a natural extension of Kashmir valley, therefore, an all-out war or large level conflict in the Ladakh and Aksai Chin region will eventually trigger an intense fall out in the both Indian administered Kashmir region as well as Azad Kashmir of Pakistan.

It should be noted that Kashmir's issues now became more militarily sensitive, especially after the Indian so-called surgical strike in Pakistan controlled Kashmir and revocation of the article-370 of its constitution and along with the rhetoric of Indian political as well as security circle claiming that Azad Kashmir also belongs to them.

Apart from that by considering the geopolitical importance of the $ 63 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Karakoram Highway, any aggressive move from the Indian side or other could escalate existing tension between two nuclear arch-rival India and Pakistan into a full-scale war that eventually has an immense risk of becoming a war of three nuclear power nation China, Pakistan and India with a devastating effect on the whole South Asia, especially in terms of nuclear radiation if any party use it in the name of so-called preemptive measures or due to wrong calculation or to counteract other.

The China-India border conflict and Bhutan

Bhutan is sandwiched between China and India but is considered as an Indian ally. The border between Bhutan and China is a sinuous line of 470 km (290 miles) long, in a north-south-east direction, which separates Bhutan to the south from Tibet, an autonomous region of China, to the north. It lies between two tri-junction formed by the two countries with India.

It was alleged that due to Indian reluctance and control over foreign policy Bhutan has yet to develop any formal diplomatic relation with its neighbor world's second-largest economy China. Despite having no formal diplomatic relations, the Dokalam standoff of 2017 between India and China created kind insecurity for Bhutan. Although Bhutan had a territorial claim over Dokalam they were in a negotiation to resolve this problem in a peaceful means, but Indian intervention as a third party made the situation complex and risk of conflict with its giant neighbor China. Therefore, during the Dokalam standoff Bhutan remain silent to avoid war among its two big neighboring countries.

Therein, any future war between China and India may create a major security threat for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bhutan, especially for the presence of Indian soldiers as well as its proximity to the strategically important Shiligori corridor that can make Bhutan a battlefield among two major Asian military power.

The China-India border conflict and Nepal 

Once known as the world's only officially the Hindu Kingdom, the Himalayan state Nepal is a landlocked, country bordering China in the north and India in the south, east, and west, while Bangladesh is located within only 27 km (17 miles) of its southeastern tip and Bhutan is separated from it by the Indian state of Sikkim.

As a landlocked nation, Nepal depended for many years on Indian imports, and India played an active role in Nepal's affairs. Due to Indian influence once Nepal was considered a haven for Tibetan refugees. But after the transition from monarchy to a democracy, in recent years Nepal has drifted away from India's influence, and China has gradually filled the space with investments, aid, and loans.

China considers Nepal a key partner in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and wants to invest in Nepal's infrastructure as part of its grand plans to boost global trade.

But after the revocation of the Article -370 of the Indian constitution; in November 2019 Delhi's published a new map of the border region that incorporated some of the territories disputed with Nepal inside India's borders. This move has angered both Nepal and China along with Pakistan wherein came as a blow to its long term friendly relations with Nepal.

It should be noted that Nepal and India share an open border of about 1,880 km (1,168 miles). India shares a border with Nepal from three sides. Much Nepalese media have reported cases of border encroachments on the part of Indian parties in multiple border regions. Nepal claims that among 27 districts that share their border with Nepal, 72 places in 23 districts have encroached.

The mainland of border contentions is Kalapani, strategically important Lipulekh, Limpiyadhura. According to Nepali officials, these three areas cover about 370 sq km (140 square miles), Nepalese officials say. The strategic Lipulekh pass connects the Indian state of Uttarakhand with the Tibet region of China.

In November 2019, there was a protest in Kathmandu opposing a new map of India. On 20 May 2020, Nepal launched its map showing its territorial claim. On 18 June, the upper house of Nepal's parliament approved a new map for the country which included territories controlled by India. India opposed the move, saying that the decision to include Limpiyadhura, Lipulekh, and Kalapani is not based on evidence or historical facts. On 19 June, Nepal started deploying its troops near the Kalapani and other disputed areas. The troops had established camps and they were working on building a helipad in the area. In the same month Nepali Army Chief, General Purna Chandra Thapa, after visiting the Kalapani border area, stated that the Nepali army will start building army barracks and border outposts near the Kalapani area.

For India, the Lipulekh pass has security implications. After its disastrous 1962 border war with China, it was concerned about a possible Chinese intrusion through the pass and has been keen to hold on to the strategic Himalayan route to guard against any future incursions.

The pass has proved a point of contention since. In May this year, the Indiandefense minister, Rajnath Singh, inaugurated an 80km (50-mile) upgraded road on the pass. The improvements will help to reduce travel time for the Hindu pilgrims that use it, but it was this move that triggered the diplomatic spat with Nepal.

The Indian army chief, General MM Naravane, has said publicly that Nepal "might have raised this problem at the behest of someone else" - an indirect reference to alleged Chinese interference. And some mainstream right-wing media in India have called Nepal "China's Proxy" for raising the border issue. The remarks did not go down well in Kathmandu.

Nepal claims that the river to the west of Kalapani as the main Kali River, hence claims these regions to be a part of Nepal. The river borders the Nepalese district of Darchula in the Sudurpashchim Pradesh province and the Indian district of Pithoragarh in Uttarakhand state. The Treaty of Sugauli signed by Nepal and British India on 3 March 1816 locates the Kali River as Nepal's western boundary with India.

Subsequent maps drawn by British surveyors show the source of the boundary river at different places. This discrepancy in locating the source of the river led to boundary disputes between India and Nepal, with each country producing maps supporting their claims. The Kali River runs through an area that includes a disputed area of about 400 km2 around the source of the river, although the exact size of the disputed area varies from source to source. Kalapani has been controlled by India's Indo-Tibetan Border Police since the Sino-Indian War with China in 1962.

Susta is another territory that is disputed between Nepal and India. It is currently controlled by India and is a part of Bihar province. Residents of a village in Susta state that Susta belongs to Nepal and they are Nepali citizens. The 1816 Treaty of Sugauli defined the Gandaki River as the international boundary between India and Nepal. The right bank of the Gandaki river was under Nepal's control while the left bank was under India's control. Susta village was initially on the right side when the treaty was signed and it was a part of Nepal. However, over the years, the Gandaki river changed its course and Susta moved to the left bank and is now under India's control. The government of Nepal has repeatedly stated that Susta belongs to Nepal and the Indian government should return the area.

India argues that the exact coordinates of the river were not mentioned in the treaty and claims that improved survey techniques have redrawn the map in the years since.

Therefore, by considering the above-mentioned fact it can be said that any future war between China and India would sandwich Nepal as a landlocked nation. It would also threaten the sovereignty as well as territorial integrity as it has a dispute over the strategically important Lipulekh Pass. Any punitive action from the Indian side also may jeopardize its normal consumer goods and energy supply line as well as escalate border conflict or tensions if not war.

The China-India border conflict and Bangladesh

South Asian country Bangladesh has friendly relations with both India and China. In terms of consumer products, raw material, industrial technology, and military hardware supply China is the main source of Bangladesh. Bangladesh also enjoys tariff-free access in the Chinese market for most of its products. Though submarine purchases from China created resentment in Indian political as well as defense establishment.

As an immediate neighbor India also a major source of consumer products and raw materials for Bangladesh despite a huge trade deficit in favor of India.

The politically current regime of Bangladesh enjoys an exceptional relationship with India in the time when India is suffering from silent diplomatic isolation from most of its South-Asian neighbors. Therefore, by taking this advantage of political rapport, India was enjoying many geopolitical dividends.

But the situation changed with the Chinese tens of $ billion investment promise along with existing investment in the various mega project in Bangladesh which made a sharp contrast with the Indian implementation process of NRC branding its Bangla speaking Muslim population as a citizen of Bangladesh with the immense threat of expulsion as a part of its anti-Muslim xenophobia. It also acted against Bangladesh in the Rohingya crisis to counterbalance China in Burma.

With the shift in regional scenario Bangladesh now in a balancing rope between its political alliance with big neighbor India and strategic and investment partner China. But a recent move from Pakistan to normalize relations with Bangladesh is also considered by many Indian annalists as a reflection strategic shift toward China.

Though Bangladesh has no direct border with China 4156 kilometers of border with India out of which 3976 kilometers are land and the rest 180 kilometers are navigable.  

According to the strategic defense analysts, given the changing scenario in South Asia and the shift in the US military policy and tactics as also its geographical location, Bangladesh has emerged vital for strategic interest. In the event of a large-scale outbreak of war between India and China, the active or passive support of Bangladesh will have an immense impact, especially by considering the proximity of the Indian Siliguri Corridor and any possible Chinese attack from the northeastern frontier or adjacent Bhutan border. Essentially the fall or collapse of the 21-kilometer Siliguri Corridor (Chicken's Neck) will result in the complete disruption of communication between India and the rest of its Seven Sister States, other than by the most expensive option - AIR.

In that case, India may pursue Bangladesh to turn its existing civil transit facilities into a military one. If Bangladesh denies India military transit access through its territory against its investment and strategic partner China that may bring a catastrophic situation for Indian defense. On the other hand, if Bangladesh succumbed to the Indian pressure; then part of Bangladesh would be a risk of turning into a battlefield of the China-India war.

Therefore, any break out of the war between two regional power China and India would be a great danger for Bangladesh both in terms of overall trade, investment, and supply of consumer products as well as national defense and security.

The China-India border conflict and its possible effect on Sri Lanka and the Maldives

Although South Asian country Sri Lanka and the Maldives have no direct border with China. But China’s contemporary relations with both Sri Lanka and the Maldives have been described as ‘models of good relations between small and big countries’. China has been an important trading partner for Sri Lanka, with a large and growing trade surplus in China’s favor in the last few years. At the same time, it has also been a significant source of investment and foreign economic assistance to Sri Lanka. Similarly, while China enjoys a large surplus in its trade with the Maldives as well, it is also a significant source of economic assistance and tourism for the Maldives. Given that India is in many ways the prominent power in South Asia, China’s relations with Sri Lanka and the Maldives in the South Asian regional context have to be analyzed in terms of two ‘strategic triangles’: China–India–Sri Lanka and China–India–Maldives.

China's increasing forays in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) through its naval assets have added a brand new dimension to the security dynamic of the region. China's decades-long economic prosperity has led to the expansion of its military and economic influence across South Asia. In recent years, arms supplies and debt funding have proven to be the backbone of Chinese policy in South Asia, especially with regards to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.

The role of China in Sri Lanka, which has grown remarkably in recent years, is poised to expand geographically further. It all began with Chinese capital and infrastructure funding in building the controversial port in Hambantota, which is additionally often referred to as one of the pilot projects by Beijing for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

India is trying hard to counter-balance this Chinese sphere of influence in both countries with temporary and nominal success. But it will be crucial for both countries to maintained neutrality in case of any event of a naval conflict among two major regional power and keep it protected from big power adversary.

September 13, 2020

Fazlous Satter is a human rights and human security activist & researcher from Bangladesh. He authored “UNDERSTANDING THE WORLD’S LONGEST CIVIL WAR: COLONIAL STATE FORMATIONS, GEOPOLITICS, CONFLICT OVER NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE GENOCIDE"

TIME TO DEMAND THE TRIAL OF FORMER WESTERN DARLING AUNG SAN SUU KYI

Fazlous Satter 

 

Third Anniversary of the Rohingya Genocide and Mass Exodus of 2017

Today 25^th August 2020 marked the third anniversary of the Rohingya Genocide and Mass Exodus of 2017. At the early hours of this day in 2017, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) launched coordinated attacks on a military base and up to 30 security force outposts across northern Rakhine State, in an apparent response to increased pressure on Rohingya communities and with the goal of global attention. A small number of minimally-trained leaders had some arms, and a significant number of untrained villagers wielded sticks and knives. Some had improvised explosive devices. Twelve security personnel were killed.

In response to this ARSA attack, the Myanmar security forces responded in the hours, days, and weeks that followed with operations. It encompassed hundreds of villages across Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung. The operations targeted and terrorized the entire Rohingya population and also their property. The authorities called them “clearance operations”. As a result, by mid-August 2018, nearly 725,000 Rohingya had fled to Bangladesh.

According to Amnesty International, in the 10 months after 25 August, the Myanmar security forces drove more than 80 percent of the Rohingya who lived in northern Rakhine State at the crisis’s outset into neighboring Bangladesh. The ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya population was achieved by a relentless and systematic campaign in which the Myanmar security forces unlawfully killed thousands of Rohingya, including young children; raped and committed other sexual violence against hundreds of Rohingya women and girls; tortured Rohingya men and boys in detention sites; pushed Rohingya communities toward starvation by burning markets and blocking access to farmland, and burned hundreds of Rohingya villages in a targeted and deliberate manner.

As per the report of the UN International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, even though the operations were conducted over a broad geographic area, they were strikingly similar. Tatmadaw soldiers would attack a village in the early hours, frequently joined by other security forces, often by Rakhine men and sometimes men from other ethnic minorities. The operations were designed to instill immediate terror, with people woken by intense rapid weapon fire, explosions, or the shouts and screams of villagers. Structures were set ablaze, and Tatmadaw soldiers fired their guns indiscriminately into houses and fields, and at villagers.

As per the report of the UN International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, the “clearance operations” constituted a human rights catastrophe. Thousands of Rohingya were killed or injured. Information collected by the mission suggests that the estimate of up to 10,000 deaths is a conservative one. Mass killings were perpetrated in Min Gyi (Tula Toli), Maung Nu, Chut Pyin and Gudar Pyin, and in villages in the Koe Tan Kauk village tract. In some cases, hundreds of people died. In both Min Gyi and Maung Nu, villagers were gathered together before the men and boys were separated and killed. In Min Gyi, women and girls were taken to nearby houses, gang-raped, then killed or severely injured. Houses were locked and set on fire. Few survived. In numerous other villages, the number of casualties was also markedly high. Bodies were transported in military vehicles, burned and disposed of in mass graves.

According to the documentation of the Amnesty International, the Tatmadaw committed large-scale massacres defined both by the scale of the killings and the fact that soldiers often carried them out through extrajudicial executions, that is, deliberately killing people who were unarmed and under their control. Members of the security forces pulled men and older boys out of their homes or herded them into an area with no obvious escape route; forced them to lie down or kneel, often after binding their hands; and then shot them at point-blank range or stabbed them with long knives. But while men and older boys were typically targeted in particular, often no one was spared. In two of the three incidents, scores of young children were killed, as soldiers opened fire on people fleeing. During each of the massacres, soldiers also raped and committed other sexual violence against women and girls. Some women and girls were killed after the rape.

In many parts of northern Rakhine State, soldiers attacked village after village over several weeks after 25 August. Rohingya men, women, and children from several dozen villages across the region described to various UN bodies and human rights organizations seeing family members or neighbors shot while everyone was fleeing a security force attack. Many of those who were shot were left for dead, as people fled in panic. Others made their way to the hills or to neighboring villages, where they at times received basic treatment from traditional doctors or from neighbors who tried to at least remove bullets and bandage wounds.

According to the report of the UN International Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, rape, and other forms of sexual violence were perpetrated on a massive scale. Large scale gang rape was perpetrated by Tatmadaw soldiers in at least 10 village tracts of northern Rakhine State. Sometimes up to 40 women and girls were raped or gang-raped together. (UNHRC.2018)

Rapes were committed often in public spaces and front of families and the community, maximizing humiliation and trauma. Mothers were gang-raped in front of young children, who were severely injured and in some instances killed. Women and girls 13 to 25 years of age were targeted, including pregnant women. Rapes were accompanied by derogatory language and threats to life, such as, “We are going to kill you this way, by raping you.” Women and girls were systematically abducted, detained, and raped in military and police compounds, often amounting to sexual slavery. Victims were severely injured before and during rape, often marked by deep bites. They suffered serious injuries to reproductive organs, including from rape with knives and sticks. Many victims were killed or died from injuries. Survivors displayed signs of deep trauma and face immense stigma in their community. There are credible reports of men and boys also being subjected to rape, genital mutilation, and sexualized torture.

According to the report of the UN-backed International Fact-Findings Mission on Myanmar, satellite imagery and first-hand accounts corroborate widespread, systematic, deliberate, and targeted destruction, mainly by fire, of Rohingya populated areas across the three townships. At least 392 villages (40 percent of all settlements in northern Rakhine) were partially or destroyed, encompassing at least 37,700 individual structures. Approximately 80 percent were burned in the initial three weeks of the operations, a significant portion of which after the Government’s official end date of the “clearance operations”. More than 70 percent of the villages destroyed were in Maungdaw, where the majority of Rohingya lived. Most destroyed structures were homes. Schools, marketplaces, and mosques were also burned. Rohingya populated areas were specifically targeted, with adjacent or nearby Rakhine settlements left unscathed.

The International Reaction and Aung San Suu Kyi’s Response

In February 2017, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra'ad al-Husse- in, published a report citing evidence of widespread abuses in Rakhine State. He accused the Myanmar government of "devastating cruelty" against the Rohingyas. In March, the UNHRC decided to send an "independent international fact-finding mission" to Myanmar to "establish the facts and circumstances of the alleged recent human rights violations by military and security forces" in Rakhine State "to ensure full accountability for perpetrators and justice for victims." This proposal was rejected by Aung San Suu Kyi, who felt that it was not "in keeping with what is happening on the ground." Ignoring her own repeated calls for international intervention in Myanmar's internal affairs over the past thirty years, she said, "We must work ourselves for our country's responsibilities because we are the ones who best understand what our country needs...We don't accept the UN's decision as it is not suitable for the situation of our country." She added that Myanmar would rely on its resources to investigate any accusations of abuses. A UN fact-finding mission was still appointed and went to Bangladesh, but it was refused entry to Myanmar.

The Hallmarks of Genocide and Textbook Example of Ethnic Cleansing

In September 2017, the OHCHR stated that, as far as could be judged without access to the conflict zone, the treatment of the Rohingyas seemed to be “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing.” The high commissioner told the Human Rights Council that security operations being conducted in Myanmar were “clearly disproportionate and without regard for the basic principles of international law.” Three months later, the OHCHR’s position had further hardened. The high commissioner said that he “would not be surprised if a future court found the military campaign against the Rohingya people amounted to genocide.” This view has since been echoed by the UN’s special rapporteur on the situation for human rights in Myanmar, Yanghee Lee, who in late 2017 was told that she was not welcome in the country for the rest of her term of office. She stated in February 2018 that the military operations conducted against the Rohingya in Rakhine State “bear the hallmarks of genocide.” In March 2018, the OHCHR called for the UN General Assembly to refer alleged atrocities committed in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court for prosecution.

The Non-Cooperation with the UN Special Rapporteur

On 18 December 2017, the Government of Myanmar, just weeks before her planned seventh country visit, informed the Special Rapporteur that all access to the country had been denied and cooperation is withdrawn for the remaining duration of her tenure. The Special Rapporteur was due to visit Myanmar in January 2018 to help prepare her report to the Human Rights Council. While the Government had responded positively to all past requests to visit, the Special Rapporteur notes that access to some areas was consistently refused by the authorities citing security concerns. Moreover, she expresses disappointment regarding the Government’s irregular request that the undertaking of her July 2017 country visit was contingent on no association with the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar.

The Role of the UN Security Council

The international community has struggled to deal with the crisis. Since the military’s campaign of crimes against humanity against the Rohingya in Rakhine State forced more than 725,000 Rohingya across the border to Bangladesh, the UN Security Council has failed to take a stand against the gravest crimes under international law, instead opting for quiet diplomacy. In that time, Myanmar has continued to deny abuses, obstruct access of humanitarian workers and independent investigators, and entrench the system of apartheid under which the remaining Rohingya live.

Between August and October 2017 the UN Security Council met five times in response to a letter from the UN Secretary-General asking it to consider the Rohingya crisis. Due to the opposition of China and Russia, no formal resolution was passed, but the Security Council strongly condemned the violence that had occurred in Rakhine State, expressed alarm at the deteriorating humanitarian situation and called on the government of Myanmar to “grant immediate, safe and unhindered access to United Nations agencies and their partners.” On November 16th, the UN General Assembly approved a human rights resolution on Myanmar, reviving annual resolutions that had been dropped in 2016 in recognition of the election of Aung San Suu Kyi’s party and the gradual democratization process taking place in the country. In February 2018, the Security Council met again to discuss Myanmar and declared that it would keep the Rohingya crisis “high on its agenda.

Findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar

In the face of Security Council inaction, in September 2018 in its resolution 34/22, the UN Human Rights Council established the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar. The President of the Council appointed Marzuki Darusman (Indonesia) as chair and Radhika Coomaraswamy (Sri Lanka) and Christopher Sidoti (Australia) as members. A secretariat was recruited by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Based on the body of information collected, the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar has concluded that the national armed forces of Myanmar (Tatmadaw) and other security forces have been committed genocide, a crime against humanity and the war crime which are serious crimes under international law that warrant criminal investigation and prosecution.

The ICC Authorization for Investigation

On 4th July 2019, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court ("ICC"), Fatou Bensouda ("OTP"), requested authorization from its Pre-Trial Chamber- III to initiate an investigation into crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in which at least one element occurred on the territory of the People's Republic of Bangladesh a State Party to the Rome Statute and within the context of two waves of violence in Rakhine State on the territory of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, as well as any other crimes which are sufficiently linked to these events" since at least 9 October 2016.

On 14 November 2019, Pre-Trial Chamber- III of the International Criminal Court ("ICC" or the "Court") authorized the Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation for the alleged crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction in the Situation in the People's Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar ("the situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar").

Now the Office of the Prosecutor will start collecting the necessary evidence from a variety of reliable sources, independently, impartially, and objectively. The investigation can take as long as needed to gather the required evidence. If sufficient evidence would be collected to establish that specific individuals bear criminal responsibility, the Prosecutor would then request Judges of Pre-Trial Chamber -III to issue either summons to appear or warrants of arrest. The responsibility to enforce warrants of arrest issued by an ICC Chamber remains with States. States Parties to the Rome Statute have a legal obligation to cooperate fully with the ICC. Other States may be invited to cooperate with the ICC and may decide to do so voluntarily. (ICC. 2019)

The Gambian Case before ICJ

On 11th November 2019, the Republic of Gambia filed an Application instituting proceedings against the Republic of the Union of Myanmar before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, alleging violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide through “acts adopted, taken and condoned by the Government of Myanmar against members of the Rohingya group”.

In this ICJ hearing, Gambia was represented by Mr. Abubacarr Marie Tambadou, Mr. Payam Akhavan, Mr. Andrew Loewenstein, Ms. Tafadzwa Pasipanodya, Mr. Arsalan Suleman, Mr. Pierre d’Argent, Mr. Paul Reichler, Mr. Philippe Sands.

On the other hand Union of Myanmar was represented by its Councilor Aung San Suu Kyi, Mr. William Schabas, Mr. Christopher Staker, Ms. Phoebe Okowa.

In its case, Gambia specifically argues that "from around October 2016 the Myanmar military (the 'Tatmadaw') and other Myanmar security forces began widespread and systematic 'clearance operations' the term that Myanmar itself uses against the Rohingya group. The genocidal acts committed during these operations were intended to destroy the Rohingya as a group, in whole or in part, by the use of mass murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, as well as the systematic destruction by fire of their villages, often with inhabitants locked inside burning houses. From August 2017 onward, such genocidal acts continued with Myanmar's resumption of 'clearance operations' on a more massive and wider geographical scale."

The Gambia contends that these acts constitute violations of the Genocide Convention. It states that it has made this claim known to Myanmar since September 2018, but that Myanmar has continued to deny any wrongdoing. The Applicant seeks to found the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain this dispute on Article 36, paragraph- 1, of the Statute of the Court and Article IX of the Genocide Convention, to which both States are parties.

At the end of its Request, apart from other remedies, the Gambia asked the ICC to indicate the following provisional measures:

“(a) Myanmar shall immediately, in pursuance of its undertaking in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9th December 1948, take all measures within its power to prevent all acts that amount to or contribute to the crime of genocide, including taking all measures within its power to prevent the following acts from being committed against [any] member of the Rohingya group: extrajudicial killings or physical abuse; rape or other forms of sexual violence; burning of homes or villages; destruction of lands and livestock, deprivation of food and other necessities of life, or any other deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the Rohingya group in whole or in part;

(b) Myanmar shall, in particular, ensure that any military, paramilitary or irregular armed units which may be directed or supported by it, as well as any organizations and persons which may be subject to its control, direction or influence, do not commit any act of genocide, of conspiracy to commit genocide, or direct and public incitement to commit genocide, or of complicity in genocide, against the Rohingya group, including extrajudicial killing or physical abuse; rape or other forms of sexual violence; burning of homes or villages; destruction of lands and livestock, deprivation of food and other necessities of life, or any other deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the Rohingya group in whole or in part;

(c) Myanmar shall not destroy or render inaccessible any evidence related to the events described in the Application, including without limitation by destroying or rendering inaccessible the remains of any member of the Rohingya group who is a victim of alleged genocidal acts, or altering the physical locations where such acts are alleged to have occurred in such a manner as to render the evidence of such acts if any, inaccessible;

(d) Myanmar and The Gambia shall not take any action and shall assure that no action is taken which may aggravate or extend the existing dispute that is the subject of this Application, or render it more difficult of resolution; and

(e) Myanmar and The Gambia shall each provide a report to the Court on all measures taken to give effect to this Order for provisional measures, no later than four months from its issuance.”(ICJ.2019)

After hearing both sides, in January 2020 Court concludes that the conditions required by its Statute for it to indicate provisional measures are met, and that it is necessary, pending its final decision, for the Court to indicate certain measures to protect the rights claimed by the Gambia. Bearing in mind Myanmar’s duty to comply with its obligations under the Genocide Convention, the Court considers that, concerning the situation described above, Myanmar must, under its obligations of the Convention, concerning the members of the Rohingya group in its territory, take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of all acts within the scope of Article- II of the Convention, in particular: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to the members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; and (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.

The Role of the State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi

According to the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, theconstitutional powers of the civilian authorities afford little scope for controlling the actions of the Tatmadaw, nor is there any indication that they participated directly in planning or implementing security operations or were part of the command structure. Nevertheless, nothing indicates that the civilian authorities used their limited powers to influence the situation in Rakhine State where crimes were being perpetrated. The State Counselor, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, has not used her de facto position as Head of Government, nor her moral authority, to stem or prevent the unfolding events, or seek alternative avenues to meet a responsibility to protect the civilian population. On the contrary, the civilian authorities have spread false narratives, denied the wrongdoing of the Tatmadaw, blocked independent investigations (including that of the fact-finding mission), and overseen the destruction of evidence. Through their acts and omissions, the civilian authorities have contributed to the commission of atrocity crimes.

Non-Implementation of Recommendations of Advisory Commission on Rakhine State

On 23 August 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi announced the establishment of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, chaired by late former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and tasked with proposing “concrete measures for improving the welfare of all people in Rakhine State.” The Commission published its final report on 24 August 2017, in which it made detailed recommendations towards ensuring freedom of movement and equal access to essential services, the closure of displacement camps, and access to citizenship among other things. The government welcomed the report and announced the establishment of a mechanism to oversee the implementation of its recommendations. Just hours later, ARSA attacked security posts across northern Rakhine State townships.

While the civilian government of Suu Kyi has repeatedly stated its commitment to implement the Commission’s recommendations following the 25 August ARSA attacks. However, the administration also has so far shown itself to be unwilling to implement this recommendation or unable to stand up to the military when it comes to accountability for serious violations in Rakhine State, and elsewhere in the country. Government officials, including Aung San Suu Kyi herself, have largely dismissed allegations of human rights violations by security forces in Rakhine State, even in the face of clear and mounting evidence.

Government attempts to investigate human rights violations in the aftermath of the October 2016 ARSA attacks were neither independent nor impartial and in March 2017 the UN Human Rights Council (HRC ) adopted a resolution mandating the creation of an independent, international Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) to establish the truth about human rights violations and abuses in Myanmar, in particular in Rakhine State. The move was met with strong opposition by Aung San Suu Kyi and her government which disassociated itself from the resolution and refused to cooperate with the FFM or allow its investigating team access to the country.

Time to Demand the Trial of Western Darling Aung San Suu Kyi

When NLD came in power in 2015 under the leadership of western darling and so-called champion of democracy Aung San Suu Kyi and formed a hybrid civilian-military government most of the western government considered it a political development towards democratic reform.

For instance, in September 2016, US President Barack Obama described the situation in Myanmar as a “good news story in an era in which so often we see countries going in the opposite direction.” The casting of Myanmar as a “good news story” captured the international narrative around the country’s political transition. In line with this narrative, international policy conversations shifted away from a focus on human rights concerns toward bolstering development and political reforms in the country. Sanctions against Myanmar were largely removed.

But in that 2015 election Rohingya was deprived of their voting rights, even a sitting member of parliament was not allowed to participate in the election. To appease the anti-Muslim ultra Buddhist group Aung San Suu Kyi nominated a single candidate neither from the Rohingya community nor from the Muslim community as a whole from Myanmar. Rather she nominated many former Tatmadaw officials to show her commitment to the armed forces establishment as well as to form a hybrid government.

As a result of these shifts in narratives, the Myanmar military remains unreformed and responsible for severe human rights violations against civilians, including Myanmar’s Rohingya.

Now the question remained wither non-use of de facto position or moral authority and blocking the investigation, using false rhetoric to safe the perpetrator of genocide, appeasing the ultra Buddhist group that committed the crime against humanity and finally declining to acknowledge the well-documented crime of genocide, a crime against humanity and war crime committed by the Tatmadaw and other security forces which are a serious crime under international law that warranted criminal investigation and prosecution is the same thing?

Not only that Aung San Suu Kyi herself was present in ICJ hearing to misguided the court and defended these crimes. So, it is not merely the question of moral authority but also the collaboration and active patronizing of the gravest international crime that requires international investigation and prosecution. Therefore, it is high time to demand the trial Aung San Suu Kyi in the International Criminal Court (ICC) or the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Fazlous Satter is a human rights and human security activist & researcher from Bangladesh. He authored “UNDERSTANDING THE WORLD’S LONGEST CIVIL WAR: COLONIAL STATE FORMATIONS, GEOPOLITICS, CONFLICT OVER NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE GENOCIDE"